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Our society seems to be possessed of a sudden anal retentive com-
pulsion to scrub clean our skies, our rivers, and our streets-perhaps
because our souls have become ineradicably sullied with the stains of
racism and poverty. Environmental crusaders might well pause
and ponder the underlying concern expressed by the Chorus in T. S.
Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral:
Clean the air! clean the skyl wash the windl take the
stone from the stone, take the skin from the arm,
take the muscle from the bone, and wash them.
Wash the stone, wash the bone, wash the brain,
wash the soul, wash them wash themil
In the current romance between public interest law devotees and
pollution, there is danger of a major moral default by the legal profes-
sion. Mayor Hatcher correctly observed that the environment issue had
done what Alabama's George Wallace had not been able to do---"dis-
tracted the attention of the nation from the pressing problems of the
black and poor people of America."' - Given the current unresponsive-
ness of the political system to ethnic minorities, the allocation of public
interest law resources to majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns is
contrary to the public interest. The political system can respond to
these concerns without siphoning off the limited, special and constitu-
tionally distinctive resources of the legal profession.
The constitutionally insulated role of legal advocacy carries a con-
comitant obligation to recognize that, while many causes may be
legitimate, the allocation of scarce legal resources to a "public" cause
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2. Address by Mayor Hatcher, Environmental Teach-in, University of Michigan,
March 14, 1970. Beneath all the rhetoric, the concern with pollution appears to be nothing
other than a way of securing subsidization for white suburban communities to cope with
the waste disposal problems caused by their hasty and ill-executed flight from the cties.
This is in keeping with the American way. We self-righteously subsidize highwa)s and
other middle-class needs, but insist on stigmatizing welfare as a dole.
1005
The Yale Law Journal
where other avenues of redress are clearly open is professionally and
institutionally immoral. As the Supreme Court stated in NAACP V.
Button: "[U]nder the conditions of modem government, litigation
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition
for redress of grievances."3 There are fashions in all things, including
fashions in righteousness, but for the legal profession to succumb to
the most recent fashion would be a betrayal of its historical and con-
stitutional role as the advocate of disenfranchised members of our
society.
Putting aside the issue of which injustice merits most attention
from the legal profession, it should be recognized that underlying the
currency of "public interest law" is a newly emergent and valid un-
derstanding of the need to protect all members of society in their
relatively passive capacity as citizens who consume not only material
goods and services but also governmental policies and programs.
The consumer of governmental policies and services-irrespective of
whether they involve pollution or poverty-is perhaps even more
helpless and passive than the consumer of material goods and ser-
vices.4 The citizen qua consumer has never been particularly effective
in any sustained manner in protecting his interest against the pro-
ducer-whether that producer be public or private and whether the
goods be non-material or material-except when "producer roles"
are created to protect the consumer interest. The public interest is
not self-defining in our society of competing private interests, but the
lawyer's role as public champion of the citizen as a consumer is in-
herent in the uniquely protected status accorded him by the adversary
process of the legal system.5
8. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
4. The need to institutionalize this function on behalf of the poor underlay the
original proposal for a legal service program. Jurisprudentially, articulation of this per.
spective in the law is rooted in the writings of Edmond Cahn. See, e.g., Cahn, Law in the
Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1963); Cahn, TmE PREDICAMENT or DrA ocR'la
MAN (1961).
5. The specially privileged status assigned the lawyer as advocate is rooted in consti-
tutional law. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), United Mine Workers v. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
Politically the insulation of the lawyer's role from external interference was demon-
strated by the position of leaders of the organized bar, transcending any apparent con.
servative-liberal dichotomy. They have risen consistently and successfully to defend the
integrity of the advocacy role from repeated congressional attempts to Impose restrlc.
tions on government-paid lawyers for the poor in the OEO Legal Services programs. See
Hannon, The Murphy Amendments and the Response of the Bar-An Accurate Test of
Political Strength, 28 LEGAL Am BRiErcAsE 163 (1970).
Within the legal profession there has been a burgeoning awareness which stems from
many sources: the vast number of new career lines in poverty law created by the OEO
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Behind the notion of public interest law lies the special relationship
between legal representation and the responsiveness of the political
system. DeToqueville, fascinated by the status of American lawyers,
shrewdly characterized the legal profession as the natural aristocracy
of a democratic society, suggesting that in a government of law, not
men, it is the Men of Law who govern.6
The lawyer has unique skills to bring to bear in marshaling coun-
tervailing power against the public and private institutions that cause
widespread secondary harm to the public through their primary oper-
ations. But this use of legal advocacy raises a series of institutional
questions about public interest law that were raised, if at all, as pe-
ripheral rather than central issues by its predecessor, "poverty law."
The current crop of public interest law firms are essentially hot-
house flowers.7 They are the product of limited, short-term foundation
largesse. A major and as yet unanswered question for these new public
interest law firms is that of economic viability. If they can realistically
subsist for only a short period, then such organizations must neces-
sarily develop a carefully defined mission, a set of priorities, a modus
operandi and a realistically phased time table based upon the time
period of projected life span. It remains to be seen whether govern-
ment or private law firms will be willing to underwrite public advo-
cacy (with integrity) on a massive scale and, if so, in what fields other
than poverty law. The question of economic viability makes it criti-
cally important to ask whether it is possible to institutionalize career
lines which permit lawyers who desire to live on a better than sub-
legal services and VISTA lawyers program; the notoriety of the work of Ralph Nader,
John Banzhaf, Benny Kass and others in the consumer law and regulatory agency law
field; the catalytic role which the Law Students Civil Rights Research Council has had
on law students; and the long standing contributions made by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, the ACLU, and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, among
others. It must, however, be recognized that the new focus on the advocacy role of
lawyers represents politically a turning away from attempts to underwrite the advocacy
function by non-lawyers and thus is, at least partially, an elitist, and implicitly anti.
democratic development.
6. 1 A. DE ToQuEvs.LE, DEMOCRACY rN AEucICA 298 (Barnes & Co. 185b').
7. Among the converging forces leading to the growth of these firms are the phenom-
enal growth of the poverty law field, from $5 million in 1964 to $58 million in 1970,
and moving rapidly toward $90 million within the next year or so; the incmased con-
gressional backlash against government programs which underite quasi political or.
ganizing efforts by the poor and the disenfranchised; the war in Viet Nam wit! its
concomitant incentive to stay in law school and to enlist in the VISTA lawyers pro-
gram; the new tax legislation with its ominous ambiguity regarding organizations which
appear to bear the stamp of social activism; and the increased racial polarity of our
nation which has made the services of fewer and fewer white professionals acceptable
to ethnic minorities. It will be interesting to see what effect President Nixon's order
eliminating occupational draft deferments will have on the growth of the VISTA law-
yers program.
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sistence level to engage substantially or exclusively in work on behalf
of clients who pay little or nothing.
Of equal concern are the moral implications of a group of inde-
pendent lawyers free to choose their own version of the public interest.
This raises the critical question of accountability in a democratic
society. Whether public interest law will develop new methods of en-
suring democratic control of the nation's resources and programs or
whether it will be a further entrenchment of the most elitist tenden.
cies in the law remains to be seen. The problem is of paramount
importance, and we will return to it later in this article.
The ultimate issue posed by the growing practice of public interest
law, however, is whether it will provide the occasion and the leverage
for confronting the crisis now faced by the rule of law-a crisis of
extreme logistical, doctrinal, institutional and philosophical dimen-
sions because of the almost mythical centrality which the judicial
process presently occupies in the legal order. The legal system is not
equipped to cope with those rights already in existence; not to men-
tion those grievances which are rights-in-embryo, nor those areas of
official discretionary conduct which have hitherto been immune from
scrutiny but which are now coming under increased attack in legal
as well as political forums. It is currently an open question whether
public interest law will simply further inundate the courts, exacer-
bate the crisis and further reduce the legal system's viability, or
whether it will generate both pressure and specific efforts to secure a
major restructuring of the legal system.
I. The Breakdown of Traditional Legal Institutions
The institutional crisis which is threatening to overwhelm the tradi-
tional adjudicative machinery of the legal system can be traced to at
least three sources.
The Rights Explosion
Recent years have witnessed the creation of a vast and still growing
array of legally vested rights which are enshrined in statutes and court
decisions but which are not honored in practice. The developing case
law regarding the rights of juveniles, tenants in public housing, per-
sons accused of crimes, welfare recipients, and minority group mem-
bers has challenged the capacity of the legal system. In the criminal
field, the newly expanded right to counsel for those charged with a
crime will require, conservatively estimated, a fivefold increase in
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the number of full-time public defenders. In the civil field, the crisis
is even more acute: cases take longer and longer to come to trial;
congestion of the court calendars increases steadily. It is reliably
estimated that it will take $90,000,000-double the resources now ex-
pended, and nearly twenty times the sum expended in 1964-to pro-
vide legal representation to the indigent in noncriminal cases.8
Concern over the shortage of lawyers and the high price of justice,
doubtless, lies behind the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,0 where the state's traditional
power to regulate the practice of law within its own courts came into
conflict with the critical need of the public for financially viable ar-
rangements to secure access to counsel in matters involving private
legal injuries.
The shortage of lawyers is matched by the incapacity of the courts
to deal with the increased workload they now face, leading both
former Chief Justice Warren and Chief Justice Burger to single out
the field of judicial administration as posing the most critical problem
facing the judiciary, more critical even than particular substantive
issues of law.
The Grievance Explosion
Each new right means, at least theoretically, that a remedy exists
for an old class of wrongs. A vast quantity of lesser injuries, however,
deserve redress but fall short of the magnitude necessary to give them
the status of legally recognized injuries. In certain situations, such
grievances are elevated to constitutional status, as in the case of the
black woman who successfully challenged an official for addressing
her by her first name.'0 Similarly, in the recent de facto school segrega-
tion case in the District of Columbia," a host of trivial differences
together constituted unconstitutionally discriminatory treatment. But,
8. Hearings Before Ad Hoc Task Force on Poverty of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor on Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1969, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. IV,
at 1819-70 (1970).
The incapacity of the profession to supply the requisite quantity and quality of repre-
sentation recently prompted Justice Douglas to remark in dissent:
The supply of lawyer manpower is not nearly large enough . . . It may uell be
that, until the goal of free legal assistance to the indigent in all areas of the law Is
achieved, the poor are not harmed by well.meaning charitable assistance of laymen.
On the contrary, for the majority of indigents, who are not so fortunate to be served
by neighborhood legal offices, lay assistance may be the only hope for achieving equal
justice at this time.
Hackin v. Arizona, 889 US. 143 (1967).
9. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
10. Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 US. 650 (1964).
11. Hobson v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.D.C., 1967).
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by and large, grievances such as these are neatly dispatched by the
aphorism, de minimis non curat lex.
The law provides no immunity from the contumely and arrogance
of officials: the taunting word "boy" flung in the face of a black male;
corporal punishment of Mexican-American children for speaking Span.
ish on school grounds; the continuous insult of being stopped, searched,
and humiliatingly interrogated. Nor does the legal system purport to
offer remedy for poor garbage collection in slum areas. Lawyers cannot
stand by to institute an action every time a child or parent is humil-
iated by a teacher, every time a taxi refuses to pick up a passenger in
the ghetto, every time a chain store offers shoddy merchandise in its
slum branches. Yet, it is just such petty grievances which cumulatively
have made tinderboxes of every major urban center.
Mounting Challenges to Official Discretion
Finally, we must add a third dimension to this crisis in the rule of
law. Elsewhere, we have termed it the "new sovereign immunity" 12-
the immunity of officials who administer major government grant pro-
grams (in the fields of poverty, welfare, housing, transportation, urban
renewal, and pollution control) from any meaningful form of scrutiny,
surveillance, criticism, challenge, or accountability. Government ex-
pends billions upon billions of dollars, presumably to aid the poor;
and other billions are being or will soon be spent on fighting crime
and pollution. Yet, the poor are still impoverished; their children
still uneducated; their lives still shorter; and the public is told that
it must measure government efforts by intentions and expenditures,
not results-by sincerity, and not by achievement.13
As the case law develops which will permit scrutiny of previously
unreviewable, discretionary decisions, 4 the case load problem faced
by the courts will become even further intensified. Moreover, the prob.
12. Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L. RFEv. 929 (1968).
13. Regarding the failure of federal food programs, see HUNGER U.S.A. (New Commt.
nity Press, 1968); THEIR DAILY BREAD (Committee on School Lunch Participation, 19068);
WHY CHILD NuTarrioN PROGRAMS FAIL (Childrens' Foundation, 1969).
The failure of U.S. Indian policy is documented in OUR IBROTuER'S KEEP=R: TIl INDIAN
IN WHrrE AMERICA (New Cammunity Press, 1969).
Is IT HELPING Poor CILDREN? (NAACP Legal Defense Fund & Washington Research
Project, 1969) describes the failure of Title I, Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
Regarding the failure of federal urban renewal relocation policy, see Hearings on Uni.
form Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Before the House Comm. on
Public Works, testimony of Edgar S. Cahn, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 379 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Peoples v. Dep't of Agriculture, #22574, Feb. 3, 1970, as modified by
22574, May 26, 1970 (D.C. Cir.); Barlowy v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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lem of securing additional legal resources to mount such challenges
will be-and, indeed, has already been-compounded by the federal
government's actions decentralizing authority and decision-making by
delegation to regional offices, state capitals and city halls. Diffusion of
responsibility will mean diffusion of accountability: decentralization
(despite its rhetoric) has already had the effect of creating a different
"national" policy for each region, influenced by political expedience
and local pressure.
Public interest law institutions that have sprung up in Washington,
D. C., will find that each battle fought and won on the national level
may well have to be fought again on the regional, state or local level.
And, as presently structured, they may find that they lack the capacity
to do battle in every forum where decisions are made that alter the
substance of federal policy. There is not now, in Washington, the
capacity to monitor the activities of the executive branch and to cope
with the lawlessness of government officials in the nation's capital.
The situation will become even more critical as it becomes clear that
once having created such a set of watchdog institutions and mech-
anisms in Washington, nothing short of a nationwide network to
supplement those institutions will be essential if the rule of law is
not to become eroded by pervasive flaunting of the law by officials at
all levels through delegation, decentralization, block grants to states
and municipalities and other techniques reducing the visibility of offi-
cial decisions.
If the rule of law is to cope with the Rights Explosion, the Griev-
ance Explosion, and the New Sovereign Immunity, the legal system
will have to be expanded and restructured. The legal profession-
particularly the growing public interest bar-is caught between two
distinctly different aspects of the institutional crisis of law. On the
one hand, public interest law predictably will lead to court cases, thus
intensifying pressure on the traditional adjudicative system's capacity
to cope with the Rights Explosion and to provide judicial redress for
a whole new range of grievances resulting from longstanding but re-
cently articulated types of disenfranchisement. On the other hand,
public interest law will have to manifest increased awareness of the
necessity to reduce the level of activity in traditional forums of re-
dress-most notably the courts-in order to get swift results as well
as to save those institutions from complete inundation and ultimate
paralysis. To escape from this quandary, the profession must begin to
develop a new technology for resolving conflicts and providing redress
for grievances.
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II. A Conceptual Framework: Consumption Versus Investment
To cope with the crisis, the legal system will have to redefine and
come to grips with the so-called "service" versus "law reform" conun.
drum.15 The poverty law practitioner's simplistic equation of law re-
form with test cases and legislative drafting represents a failure to
understand the institutional dimension of the crisis. Instead of merely
inundating the courts, law reform must focus on developing new ways
to complement a judicial system increasingly incapable of responding to
the Rights and Grievance Explosions. There is a need to concentrate
on extra-judicial, institutionally oriented law reform rather than leg-
islative drafting and test cases.
The resolution of the endless service-versus-law reform debate lies
in a more useful conceptual dichotomy drawn from economic theory.
Underdeveloped countries, we are told, remain poor because they
teeter so on the edge of subsistence that they cannot and do not save
any portion of current income for use in increasing their future pro-
ductive capacity. They cannot obtain technological innovation and
increased productivity unless they find some way of diverting income
from consumption to investment or supplement their present income
with special sources of investment capital.
We would advance the proposition that the application of this prin-
ciple provides a key to generating change and increased productivity
in the current system for producing legal services, legal redress, and
more broadly, justice. In exploring the implications of this proposi-
tion, we shall draw upon the experience gleaned from the OEO legal
services program, the main source of legal assistance for the poor.
When legal service organizations concentrate on the service function,
they in effect devote all their resources to the production of consum-
ables. Few resources, if any, are devoted to capital formation for pur-
poses of significantly increasing the productive capacity of the legal
system to respond to broad classes of injustice and inequity. The
consumers of legal services-the poor-rely more and more on this
"foreign" professional assistance to vindicate their rights rather than
becoming producers of effective redress themselves. The goal of self-
sufficiency appears to become more distant as the professional program
grows. 16
15. The equation of law reform with test cases has providcd ready ammunition for tho
congressional backlash expressed in the Murphy Amendment's attempt to restrict the
forms of advocacy. See, Holmes, The Poverly Lawyers' Work is So Good It Has To Be
Stopped, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (June 1970).
16. We have elsewhere tried to analyze the defects, obsolescence, and Inherent lixlta.
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The legal services attorney who feels himself overwhelmed with de-
mands for current services is, like the underdeveloped nation, too
perilously close to subsistence (as he defines it: furnishing the max-
mum quantity of services consistent with minimal quality standards)
to honor any priority that does not cater to present needs, present de-
mands, immediate gratification and immediate consumption.17 Among
these pressures the attorney must list, of course, the very critical need
to use today's grant so as to secure tomorrow's salary and to justify one's
past existence to wave after wave of evaluators. Such legal service
lawyers have, in fact, internalized the crisis syndrome of the poor. As
with the poor, planning has precious little relevance or utility in the
face of continuing crisis. That such crises may, in no small measure,
be of one's own creation is irrelevant. That one's present mode of
operation invites and, indeed, rewards and reinforces crisis patterns
does not alter what is perceived: The difficult present is all-engulfing,
and continuing crises rob both individuals and institutions of the abil-
ity to perceive themselves as having the power to avert many of the
crises they face. The answer-both for the poor and their caretakers
-is not more test cases and increased dependency on a profession and
institutions already inundated with consumption demands that cannot
be met.
The utility of this conceptual formulation stems from one inescap-
able fact: Our present brand of judicially oriented legal services for
the nonaffluent is incapable of providing justice on a mass scale for
the mass market that a democratic society creates when it seeks to
guarantee "Equal Justice under Law." In recasting the service-versus-
law reform dichotomy we must strike a new balance between the
necessity of vindicating the new rights of disenfranchised citizens and
our need to alleviate the pressures on an increasingly inundated judi-
cial system. If rights are not to be sacrificed, if justice is not to be ra-
tioned in the interest of relieving pressure on the courts, we must begin
tions in the current method by which the legal system produces legal redress and have
attempted to indicate some of the changes which a medieval guild s)stem of production
must undergo via its own form of industrial revolution in order to meet tie demands
of the mass market for justice in a democratic society. See Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice:
The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 927 (1966). We would asert
once again that the market is not for "legal services"; the market is for Justice. Legal
services is simply a brand name which currently has a monopoly.
17. Whatever investment is made in the form of in-service training, professionalization,
up-grading, and ironically, even law reform (as presently interpreted) does not constitute
an investment in technological change. Rather it is merely what the economists refer to
as duplication, replacement of worn-out capital goods, or linear expansion of a funda-
mentally antiquated technology.
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to invest in new justice-producing institutions which can supplement
and, in some cases, supersede the old ones.
The utility of the investment concept for the rule of law will be
determined ultimately by the extent to which it facilitates conscious
movement toward increased self-sufficiency on the part of the aggrieved
and permits them to secure effective redress without dependency on
an ever increasing volume of "foreign" legal aid. To be sure, there is
nothing novel in the idea that the law needs additional institutions
and expanded enforcement mechanisms to become more effective. It
is the crisis in the rule of law in this country, the threatened collapse
of the legal institutions we depend upon, that makes our present need
for conceptual articulation of the investment function so acute.
Yet, to an extent that one can only dimly perceive it, the cultural
arrogance of our society and the inbred elitism of our profession stand
squarely in the path of any effort to restructure the legal system to
meet even the current demands we place upon it. If we are to plan
effectively for the expanded demands for justice that the Rights and
Grievance Explosions and the challenge to the New Sovereign Im-
munity promise, we must begin to look beyond the Anglo-Saxon
experience with justice-producing mechanisms and to contemplate
institutions that do not rely on the legal profession for their normal
functioning.
Thus, for instance, from the Indian culture (past and present), we
can learn the elements of a legal system that relies heavily on group
sanctions-ridicule, community ostracism and disapproval. Certain
aspects of law enforcement and conflict resolution are shifted to legit-
imated, non-judicial forums.
In Alaska . . . all disputes except murder are settled by a song
duel... The song duel consists of lampoons, insults, and obscen-
ities that the disputants sing to each other and of course, to their
delighted audience . . . [T]he loser suffers a great punishment,
for disapproval of the community is very difficult to bear in a
group as small as that of the Eskimo.18
Even the incredible proliferation of test case law in the welfare field
is basically engrafted onto a system stemming back to the Poor Laws
and workhouses of England. Other cultures have found other ways:
The Arctic Explorer Peter Freuchen once made the mistake of
thanking an Eskimo hunter with whom he had been living for
18. FARB,. MAN'S RSE TO CIVILIZATION As SHoWN 13Y T11t INDIANS Or NorTai AMsnM.A,
45-46 (1969).
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some meat. Freuchen's bad manners were promptly corrected:
"You must not thank me for your meat; it is your right to get
parts. In this country, nobody wishes to be dependent upon
others... .With gifts you make slaves just as with whips you
make dogs."'19
The impersonal sterility of our system of criminal law is made the
more impervious to reform because our cultural and racial arrogance
prevents us from learning from others. Felix Cohen, characterizing the
Indian tribal codes, notes:
The form of punishment is, typically, forced labor for the benefit
of the tribe or of the victim of the offense, rather than imprison-
ment.
The tribal penal codes, for the most part, do not contain the usual
catch-all provisions to be found in state penal codes (vagrancy,
conspiracy, criminal syndicalism, etc.), under which almost any
unpopular individual may be convicted of crime ....
The comparison suggests that perhaps the Indian penal codes
may be more "civilized" than the non-Indian.20
An impersonal legal system, separated from neighborhoods and local
communities, divorced from any significant element of popular par-
ticipation, stubbornly persists in limiting the availability of justice.
A non-lawyer had the following comment to make on our legal system:
You have a very complicated legal system. It is not that way with
my people. I have always thought that you had so many laws be-
cause you were a lawless people. Why else would you need so
many laws? After all, Europe opened all her prisons and sent her
criminals to this country. Perhaps that is why you need so many
laws. I hope we never have to reach such an advanced state of
civilization.21
The speaker was an Indian-well acquainted with the white man's
-brand of justice.
One might expect and perhaps even endorse continued reliance on
mere linear expansion of our present legal institutions if there were
any realistic basis for believing that more courts and more judges
could, by themselves, cope with the variegated demands for legal re-
dress. But when, as now, commentators from virtually every point on
19. Id. at 43.
20. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 Mim. L. Rv. 145, 156 (1940).
21.- Statement by Janet McCloud, a Tulalip Indian, at Law Day ceremonies. Univer-
sity'of Washington Law School, May 1, 1969.
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the ideological spectrum grant that the formal adjudicative machinery
is institutionally inappropriate for a variety of functions, our exclu-
sive dependence on those same avenues of legal redress is intolerable.
We can no longer afford to deny legitimation to new forums, to new
types of sanctions, to new categories of "men of law" merely because
they do not fit a comfortably familiar culture-bound pattern. The
legal profession must begin consciously to cast about for new modes
of investment to stave off the crisis facing the presently besieged rule
of law by moving systematically toward reconstituting the basic ele-
ment of a viable legal system.
The magnitude of this task-and the scope of the changes required
to cope with the demands upon the legal system-can be inferred from
a preliminary survey of some of the most obvious places where invest-
ment in innovative restructuring and expansion of our legal system
is critically needed.
III. Uses of Investment Capital
There are at least four principal areas where the investment of
dollars, manpower, and institutional resources would yield critically
needed changes: The creation (and legitimation) of new justice-dis-
pensing institutions, the expansion of the legal manpower supply
through new forms of legal education, the development of a new body
of procedural and substantive rights, and the development of forms
of group representation as a means of enfranchisement.
A. Establishment of New Legal Institutions
There is a manifest need to develop institutions competent to deal
with problems and grievances which courts are ill-equipped to handle.
Certain grievances are de minimis to the law, and the law provides no
redress. Other grievances involve virtually closed institutions which,
in all but the most extraordinary cases, are their own judge and jury
-school systems, hospitals, police departments all are a law unto
themselves. Still others are only a small part of a complex pattern of
conflict and injustice, compounded by years of insensitivity so that
the particular grievance cannot be approached within a limited, two-
party, case-and-controversy framework without distorting the actual
nature of the conflict.
Litigation does not necessarily provide an effective way of redress-
ing many such grievances. The doctrinal posture of the courts may
dictate that they abstain from substantive review of acts of official
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discretion even when the decision of the official results in injury or
hardship to the presumed beneficiaries of those actions. There are
other cases best handled out of the court as presently constituted be-
cause the judicial quest for fault, the stigma involved in formal judicial
proceedings, the delay and expense and psychological strain, the hos-
tility or lack of empathy engendered by differences of class, or race,
or verbal style all make it highly desirable for the parties to seek some
alternative mode for settling their dispute.22 Finally, even those cases
which survive the winnowing process and secure judicial vindication
for the aggrieved are subject to the incredible expense, delay and pro-
cedural entanglement of the court system which substantially reduces
the value of judicial remedy for the individual involved.
There are a few scattered beginnings in developing new legal and
para-legal institutions, but much more investment in experimentation
is needed. Programs to provide mediation and arbitration of disputes,
bureaus to take complaints of citizens, lay advocates within the school
system and welfare system, special juvenile courts run by juveniles,
neighborhood advisory groups to the local prosecutor's office, commu-
nity patrols to police the streets and report lawlessness by citizens and
police alike, citizens' advice bureaus modeled after those in England,
ombudsman offices where a public official serves as watchdog and in-
vestigator of official conduct, are all possibilities which may suit a
particular community's needs or the needs of a particular functional
area. These institutions are difficult to design and require the sophis-
tication and expertise of a lawyer to describe their functions and
processes so that local groups can understand and use them. What is
even more difficult is to design from scratch an institution which
blends several of these approaches into a coherent institution capable
of responding to the special concerns of local groups.23
Designing new legal institutions requires recognition that law is
not solely or even centrally an affair for courts, but rather consists in
22. The rabbinical courts of the Associated Synagogues of Massachusetts provided a
unique breakthrough in landlord-tenant relations when it provided for a formal agree-
ment on grievance procedures (among other things). Both parties-landlords and tenant!-
agreed to abide by a board of review and Rabbinical Court. This was the first instance
of successful negotiation and sanctioning of an ecclesiastical court as an alternative to
the judicial system. Appeals to governmental agencies were complex, costly, frustrating
and got bogged down in lower courts. However, "the sanctions available to the Rabbinical
Court for those of Jewish faith [allowed] ... both parties [to agree] ... to submit their
grievances to the Court." Statement by Robert Spangenberg, Director, Boston Legal Assis-
tance Project, as quoted in 3 LAW iN AcTION at 3 (Aug. 1968).
23. For a discussion of the right to speak and the right to influence decision-making,
see Cahn & Calm, Citizen Partidpation, published in Crnzms PA~ciPATioN, A C
Boox IN DEUOCRACY 7, 38-54 (1969).
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constellations of forums where pressures bearing the imprimatur of
legitimation are exerted to make conduct conform to publicly artic-
ulated norms, rules, policies, and principles. Courts are one such
forum, but judicial proceedings and rules of law are only one amongst
the kind of pressures available. In a number of contexts, we have
experimented with the creation of new forums-to air grievances, to
bring outside scrutiny to bear upon an otherwise closed system, to
generate pressures which cause officials to become responsive, not sim-
ply to a single plaintiff or class of plaintiffs, but to a spectrum of
community wishes, concerns and commonly held values activated by
the creation of a forum in which they could be heard.
Most recently, we were involved in the structuring and conduct of
a "Peoples' Forum," a community inquest held in Memphis to probe
into bail procedures, the right to protest, and discriminatory hiring
and promotional policies within the police force, harassment efforts,
brutality and stop-and-frisk tactics of the Memphis Police Force.24
While the Forum was called for and held under the auspices of a
coalition of local groups, several key elements enhanced the Forum's
effectiveness: bringing in prominent outsiders as "hearing examiners;"
promulgating simple, equitable procedures with an air of formality
(without needless adversary technicalities); ample publicity; and care-
ful staff work in securing expert testimony from outside the community
and witnesses with differing knowledge and viewpoints coming from
different elements in the community. The end result was a proceeding
in which certain official conduct and practices were exposed to wide-
spread community comment, and, in some cases, disapproval, and a
proceeding in which the basic concern of the community was to find
out how to live with itself, to discover its own problems, and to talk
to itself candidly in a quest for solutions rather than to arrive at some
judgment of guilt or fault.
A closely related and largely unexplored area for the creation of
new "legal" institutions is the potential provided by the mass media
for informing people of their rights, bringing community disapproval
to bear upon particular actions of particular officials, and generating
support for norms delimiting the range of permissible behavior in a
society where the "legal norms" may have little reality or authority in
the community. Cable TV and community owned and operated radio
24. The structure and hearing procedure of the "Peoples' Forum" was essentially that
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. A copy of the Rules and Regulations governing
the proceedings and a detailed press release are on file at the Yale Law Journal.
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stations in particular have substantial potential for creating new,
legitimated forums for community debate, norm promulgation and
sanctioning-from praise to condemnation. In this connection, it is
worth noting that the chief weapon available to the Ombudsman in
Scandinavian countries is the final issuance of a report condemning
officials and agencies for their policies or decisions. In this country,
highly publicized reports and TV documentaries dealing with hunger,
Indians, the Federal Trade Commission, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, Medicare and Medicaid have all demonstrated the
de facto sanctioning power of the mass media. It remains to be seen
whether such forums can be legitimated to supplement a restructured
legal system for the "tribal community" that Marshall McLuhan claims
the electronic media have recreated.
B. Expansion of the Legal Manpower Supply
The legal system, however defined, faces a critical manpower short-
age-a lack of justice-producing persons, "men of law." The present
crisis of the legal system requires far more than merely educating more
lawyers, although in many areas of the country-and in many areas
of the law-more lawyers are needed. Expansion of the legal man-
power supply further entails three distinct tasks.
First there is a real need to expand the supply of manpower which
can be effectively absorbed into existing legal institutions. An experi-
enced legal secretary can handle a very large number of routine matters
at a law firm or legal aid office (as many often do). There is no reason
why that status and function should not be formalized systematically,
as has been done in the medical profession. Many technical jobs now
performed by lawyers must be broken down and analyzed to determine
whether they can be done more efficiently by less extensively trained
persons. New legal technician roles should have their own career lines,
training program, and system of accreditation. There are no justifiable,
functional barriers to developing such legal technician roles except
the profession's own self-serving notion of the intrinsic mystery of
legal tasks. Freeing lawyers from routine tasks--drafting form docu-
ments, tedious Shepardizing, negotiating with welfare caseworkers--
might, indeed, free them to contribute more profoundly to both their
client's and the rule of law's welfare.
Second, expanding the supply of legal manpower must also be an
integral part of the process of creating new legal institutions. Thus,
for instance, we have proposed the creation of neighborhood courts,
of people's forums, of a student advocate center, and of other institu-
1019
The Yale Law Journal
tions all of which we would define as "legal" and all of which would
be staffed by "legal" manpower, including lawyers, legal technicians,
lay advocates, arbitrators, mediators, or ombudsmen for parents, stu-
dents or consumers. Most notably, in the realms of health care and
education (as in the now familiar field of welfare rights) there is a
critical need for advocacy mechanisms which can penetrate otherwise
closed institutions. In these areas, law normally defines only the outer
limit of permissible behavior. Minor offenses, seemingly trivial actions
or long entrenched, mildly offensive practices which do not quite trans-
gress those outer limits generate serious grievances that can only be
redressed by new modes of legal intervention.
In the context of education, for example, the question is whether
effective legal advocacy combined with an independent grievance
mechanism within the school system can shield a child from institu-
tional practices which have long demonstrated their capacity to retard,
discourage and destroy a child's sense of confidence and his capacity
to perform.25 Thus, one formulation of the role of the law in educa-
25. The following is simply a random list culled from one school system of the minu.
tiae which cumulatively assure the present failure of our educational system:
1. Children are forced to reveal that they are on ADC to secure workbooks free.
2. Children on welfare are forced to pay for school lunches on the school lunch
program.
3. Poor parents working in New Careers programs, breakfast programs, etc., are
afraid to speak their minds for fear of losing their jobs.
4. Teachers and counselors force students to take general courses and lead the
child to believe that they should not take college preparatory or business courses,
5. If a child commits three alleged "disciplinary" offenses, he and his parents
automatically may be referred downtown to central administration to a person who
in all probability has no knowledge of the child or his problems.
6. Principals, teachers, and students spend large portions of time on candy sales
and other so-called money-making ventures which in fact only benefit the candy
company.
7. Women gym teachers habitually prod stout girls' stomachs to see if they are
pregnant. They get Brownie Points if they happen to locate an expectant mother
and report her to the principal for immediate expulsion.
8. Children are promoted because of chronological age rather than scholastic
achievement.
9. Children are promoted because they are easy going and obedient, while other
children are retained because they are outspoken.
10. High school students are disciplined because they raise questions about errone-
ous statements made by teachers.
11. High school students are disciplined because they complain about teachers
coming to school too intoxicated to teach.
12. Kids who live with rats, roaches, wine bottles, and cops beating their parents
are taught to read from books about Dick and Jane that do not relate to their en.
vironment.
13. Substitute teachers, who are poorly qualified to teach in low-Income schools,
teach in such schools out of proportion to other schools.
14. Certain teachers are noted for sending a great number of kids to the office, and
the kids are always investigated rather than the teachers.
15. Transfer students are placed without any preparation for new course work.
16. School laboratories are locked, and students not allowed to use them.
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tion might be to protect the presumption of educability of a child,
just as in the criminal law, it protects the presumption of innocence.
In short, law might no longer permit the school system, like the pros-
ecutor, to pronounce a verdict of guilty and a sentence of failure,
retardation or drop-out. Instead, the school system might be required
to bear the burden of proof each step of the way, at each moment
when it sits in judgment on a child's attitude or performance or capac-
ity. In many, many schools, the burden of proof now rests with the
minority group or low-income child. It rests there wrongly. Effective
legal advocacy within the school system should have the purpose of
shifting that presumption-of compelling accountability, of forcing
the educator and the educational system to shoulder the burden of
proof rather than make the child the scapegoat for an institutional
record of failure.
Finally, and ultimately, expanding the legal manpower supply must
involve increasing the capacity of each individual to cope indepen-
dently and preventatively with situations posing the possibility of legal
injury. Thus, we would propose teaching legal concepts in grade
school as a means of protecting that fragile sense of morality and fair
play with which children enter the wider world. We submit that the
child's moral sensitivity and basic sense of fair play and reciprocity
can be reinforced and strengthened both as a defensive and offensive
weapon for the child's well-being in a manner that will enable him to
cope more effectively with his environment, to sort out real from
fancied injuries, to honor obligations, and to hold both his peers and
seniors to standards of conduct which are equitable and rooted in rea-
sonable expectation. Coleman's study observes a direct correlation
between a child's academic performance and his belief that he has some
control over his own destiny, that he counts, that he can affect his own
future by his own actions.28 Conversely, the study indicates that poor
17. Parents are coerced by teachers into making examples of their children by
physically beating them in the presence of their classmates.
The source of the above list oJgYevances is the "Proposal for a Student Advocate
Center to Secure Legal Redress for Student Rights and Grievances," 49-51. Copy on file
at the Yale Law Journal.
Most states, it should be noted, have an extensive body of school law and regulations
governing school administration. If those regulations and rules were viewed, not simply
as "instructions" to school administrators, but rather as being made to benefit the stu-
dent and thus as vesting certain rights of enforcement in him to ensure that school
administrators acted in the student's best interest as defined by law, then a vast new
body of rights would emerge. The "right to read" program and the development of
performance contracting, where payment to outside contractors is scaled to performance
ratings (popularly known as "read or else'), may constitute a breakthrough here. See
Wgash. Post, July 15, 1970.
26. CoLwMAN, EQuAtrrY oF EDucATioNAL Oppoa=uNrry (1966).
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academic performance is accompanied by the attitude that his future
depends entirely on "luck" and "breaks." 27 We believe that a care-
fully trained teacher can communicate the most basic and the most
complex legal concepts in directly relevant terms: Evidence (But,
teacher, I didn't do it); Precedent (But teacher, you let them do it);
Contract (But you promised me); Corporate Organization (Let's start
a club); Tort (He scared me); Equity (It isn't fair). We posit that there
may well be a positive correlation between academic achievement and
the understanding of legal concepts which entail propositions about
cause and effect, behavior and reward, act and consequence-and,
thereby, instill a belief that one can have some effect on one's own
destiny. A right, in Hohfeldian terms, is the ability to compel some
person to perform a duty.28 The ability to generate predictable results
based upon legally binding relationships lies at the heart of law-
and may correlate directly with academic achievement to the extent
that law can vindicate and reinforce the belief that one can have some
control over one's own life.
Decreasing the dependency of the layman on the legal profession
increases the justice-producing capability of the society at large and
frees other "capital" elements of the legal system for other tasks. Thus,
education in the law has major investment potential if it affects basic
perceptions at an early age, increases one's ability to resist injustice and
to compel fair dealing, if it enables one to distinguish between real and
fancied injustices and if it instills a sense of mutual obligation and
mutual responsibility. To acomplish these ends, law ought to be taught,
long before children begin to accept it cynically merely as a set of tech-
nical rules for dealing with the police and avoiding responsibility for
illegal actions. Investment entails restructuring fundamental cognitive
processes to include basic values, standards and concepts-freedom,
justice, reasonableness, free speech, due process, honoring promises,
deciding like cases alike and respecting the rights of others.
C. Increasing the Accountability of Officials-New Doctrines of Law
Most of the new doctrines of law which have emerged in recent years
are procedural in nature. They do not attack the basis of an official
decision-but only the manner in which that decision was reached. The
right to counsel, the right to a hearing, the right to be informed of the
charges against one are essentially procedural rights. They affect the
27. d. at 275.90.
28. For a concise analysis and summary of Hohfeld's jurisprudential view on this
and other issues, see K. LLEviLLYN, THz BwIbt= Busu 84.88 (1951).
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outcome of a decision by requiring the decision-maker to take account
of previously unintroduced facts in reaching his decision and in artic-
ulating its basis. They also affect the outcome by making capitulation
(individual and wide-scale) cheaper than observing all the procedural
niceties which make justice so expensive for all involved. We can expect
-with the Freedom of Information Act"0 (if used more vigorously than
hitherto), with broadened definitions of standing, and with increased
enumeration of the requirements of due process-to witness an expan-
sion of these procedural doctrines.
But just as important, we need to begin developing a body of law
which speaks more directly to substantive issues; for a biased decision.
maker, having gone through the motions of hearing all sides, can often
reach the same unjust conclusion if he really wants to. We are not
urging a return to the days of the 1930's when the courts threw out
New Deal legislation by reading their own economic and political
biases into the Constitution. But we do think that new grounds for
scrutinizing government programs are emerging. They will take the
form, first, of demanding (either legally or politically) that an agency
articulate its minimal goals in measurable, specific terms; second, that
an agency take the steps necessary to collect the information needed to
determine whether those goals are being reached; and third, that the
agency develop the sanctions and incentives necessary to ensure adher-
ence to its policies and attainment of its target goals. Thus, while
judges will not second guess administrators on how best to fulfill a
broad policy mandate, creative advocacy can begin to develop new
ways of increasing the public accountability of agencies by requiring
the articulation of certain minimal performance specifications and then
devising ways of holding the agency to its own goals and policies.
D. Forms of Group Representation and Enfranchisement
The process of enfranchisement through legal redress in our society
has outstripped the capacity of our legal system to enforce new rights
and to formalize the institutions which have given them birth. In vir-
tually every community, a spate of grass-roots organizations has
emerged. Some specialize in particular concerns such as welfare, public
housing, consumer fraud, discrimination in the construction trades,
landlord-tenant relationships, and public education; others are of a
more general nature, concerned with operating programs and represent-
ing the neighborhood vis-a-vis the larger community. Such groups are
29. 5 U.S.C. 552 (Supp I, 1967).
1023
The Yale Law Journal
skilled in making general demands, developing bargaining leverage,
pressing for overall changes-but often lose everything and even dis-
solve because they cannot list a bill of particulars and cannot enumerate
the specific concessions they want, such as the clauses written into a
public housing lease or an installment sales contract. Others, such as
welfare rights organizations, tenants organizations, and recipients of
federal grants, often have to fight against harassment, official retaliation
and death by attrition caused by bureaucratic delay, sometimes pur-
poseful, sometimes inadvertent. Still others have reached a point of
maturity where they want to formalize their existence, draw up a char.
ter and by-laws, or incorporate and define the rights and duties of
different classes of shareholders. In other communities the poor want
to form unions not only to secure better wages and working conditions
but also to invest part of their wages in group enterprises and services.
And increasingly, organizations of the poor seek governmental and
private grants but lack the staying power, the formal organizational
structure, the mastery of jargon, the art of "packaging" their idea
(grantsmanship) or the range of negotiating styles necessary to overcome
the unending obstacles presented by seemingly objective, but in fact
discriminatory, requirements.
By and large, legal service programs have not handled these kinds
of group representation and have rarely acted either as advocate and
negotiator for groups, or as legal advisor and house counsel. Yet the
structuring of new organizations and enterprises has always been one
of the most important roles of the legal profession. The relation of the
professional to grass-roots groups, of white lawyers to all-black groups,
of legal advisors to those engaged in civil disobedience, involve some of
the most difficult and challenging issues facing the legal profession
today. This is the "corporate" or "constitutional" function through
which lawyers historically have made their most distinctive contri-
butions: shaping the basic ground rules within which human beings
would be free to create, to participate and contribute without con-
tinued dependency on the legal profession.
IV. Two Untapped Sources of Investment Capital-Law Schools and
Law Firms
We believe, in the next months and years, that law schools and law
firms represent the greatest potential sources of investment capital for
restructuring the legal system. Substantial pressures-from within law
firms and law schools, from law students and from the broader com-
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munity--can increasingly make it in the best interest of these institu-
tions consciously to commit resources to such ends. Nor do we under-
estimate the extent of residual concern and conscience which is a self-
generating force within those institutions.
Law schools must begin to discharge their duty to the larger society
on an institutional basis, by changing the type of training provided
lawyers, by institutional involvement in the operation of the legal sys-
tem, and by serving as a primary "brain bank" for ideas, expertise and
manpower to design, test, and implement models for institutional
change within the legal system.
Apart from the contribution which government and foundations can
make, private law firms must become involved on an institutional basis
in public interest work, giving priority to those fields and client groups
where the political system is least responsive and where recourse to
the law is tantamount to political enfranchisement. Through such in-
volvement, law firms will be able to bring to bear their cumulative
expertise in non-judicial forums, in developing other forms of "law
making," in creating new institutions for vindicating the rights of the
disenfranchised.
A. The Law School as a Source of Capital Investment
Law schools represent a major but largely untapped resource for
investment in innovation within the legal system. Law schools' training
function and accreditation power seem peculiarly suited to experiments
in expanding the manpower supply of the legal system-educating not
only lawyers but, more broadly, Men of Law. These considerations
would appear to make the law school an ideal resource bank for in-
vestment in the restructuring of the legal system. Moreover, the present
trend toward clinical legal education programs, combined with stu-
dent demands for "involvement" and "relevance," would appear to
make such a development timely.
Ironically, nearly every element of legal training militates against
such a development. Legal education operates to enervate moral in-
dignation and to inculcate intellectual and moral timidity. The dis-
cipline of scholarship feeds on itself, validates itself, and perpetuates
those aspects of the legal system which decrease the capacity of the
system to respond to injustice.
The intellectual and moral intimidation generated by legal edu-
cation takes many forms. First, law school courses never present raw
fact-the injury as felt, perceived, and apprehended by flesh and blood
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beings. Typically, the quest for fact moves backward from a legal con-
clusion contained in an appellate decision, through a mythical recon.
struction of the past (as filtered through restrictive laws of evidence)
and finally ends in assessing the grievances of parties possessing all the
animation implicit in their classic names-Richard Roe and John Doe.
Second, one's willingness to speak from partial knowledge, from un-
certainty, from empathy unsubstantiated by conclusive documentation
is systematically discouraged. The only facts which are considered are
those which meet the convoluted and rarefied standards of proof
needed for one and only one forum-the courts. Intuitively formulated
hypotheses are not even honored as points of departure for more
systematic attempt to marshal the facts needed to generate change.
on which human beings normally base judgment, those instinctive,
emotional reactions which are the well-springs of moral action, are
viewed as "unprofessional." Yet, they are often the predicates of any
systematic attempt to marshal the facts needed to generate change.
In life we never have all the facts we optimally could use to make a
decision. To impose such a prerequisite to speech in the law classroom
is in fact to compel silence. And all too often, to withhold one's voice
is an act of moral abdication.80
Third, legal discussion typically preoccupies itself with legal rules
and legal doctrines. The more "avant garde" discussions utilize the
findings of other disciplines and advance them as bases for rejecting one
doctrine and accepting another. The debate rarely moves from rules
and doctrines to issues of legal institutions or new modes of redress
available outside of courts. But when an institution stands as an in-
superable barrier to effective remedy, the practitioner must turn to new
institutions, forums, doctrines, and rules. This is the area of debate
that will ultimately determine the shape of a new legal system capable
of dealing with the vast explosion of rights and grievances and un-
50. In serving as staff to the Citizens' Board of Inquiry Into Hunger and Malnutrition
in the United States, the Citizens Advocate Center found to its dismay that there were
less than three dozen studies dealing with the malnutrition and hunger of the poor in
the United States and that many of those were methodologically questionable. In the
face of clear but scientifically uncorroborated indications of widespread hunger and
malnutrition, the report's two principal editors, Edgar S. Cahn and S. Steven Rosenfeld,
in desperation evolved three rule-of-thumb principles:
Principle I-You go with what you got.
Principle II-You can't go with what you don't got.
Principle III-You can't go with what you don't got,
but you can promise to go with It
when you get it.C). HUNGER U.SA. (New Community Press, 1968).
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checked discretionary decisions for which the courts will provide, at
best, a forum of last resort.
To the extent that a law school indulges in debate about the legal
system, its debates on specific doctrines and rules usually take the
form of a pitched battle between those who are result-oriented (fre-
quently, but not necessarily equated with judicial activists), and those
who argue from the constraints of and the limits of judicial competency.
Until academic debate embraces institutional as well as doctrinal
activism, law schools will breed intellectual and moral sterility. It will
turn out lawyers il-equipped to recognize the possibility of creating
new forums, ill-fitted to serve the needs of the injured and the dis-
enfranchised through the legitimizing force of the law and the legit-
imizing power of the legal profession.
Fourth, law schools militate against the use of law as an instrument
of social reform by imposing standards of acceptable performance
which are perniciously narrow. They reward ingenuity, even at the
expense of humane perceptiveness; they reward removal from the
chaotic world of emotion, events, passions and people to the rarefied
stratosphere of metaphysical debate where the ability to proliferate
distinctions is the ultimate offensive and defensive skill. We do not
deny the value of rigorous legal analysis as an indispensable skill nor
would we make its acquisition merely an optional aspect of legal edu-
cation. We only take exception to its being the only standard of aca-
demic performance. The ability to speak to a client, to understand
another human being, to take an inchoate and ill-defined set of de-
mands and give them structure and content-all these capacities go
largely unrecognized and unrewarded in law school. Unfortunately,
those among the faculty who are fit to judge-or to guide-are few and
far between.31
Fifth, the law school-as an institution-has failed to acknowledge
that it has an institutional obligation to the legal system as a whole.
Academic freedom and legal scholarship have become the shibboleths
for defending a massive institutional default which is not remedied by
31. The faculty recruitment system rewards those who achieved by the standards of
intellectual dexterity and moral timorousness-made law reviews, served out a clerkship,
practiced for a year or two (during which little or no contact with live clients was per-
mitted by the firm) and finally sought the solace, serenity, and sanctuary of like-mindcd
souls. Whatever motivations call persons to teaching law, they unfortunately rarely draw
those who would emulate Stephen Daedulus going to encounter for the millionth time
the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience
of my race," J. JoYcE, PoaRTaArr oF TH ARnsr As A YOUrc MAN 253 (Viking, 1969).
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the concern of individual professors or the offering of two or more
courses in poverty law, urban law, or social policy. The issue is whether
the law school, as an instituiton of higher education, can utilize its
unique vantage point and its relative detachment to enable society to
proceed more rationally to reshape its legal system, to provide effective
redress of grievances and to permit orderly and rapid social change
within the framework of the rule of law. As quasi-public institutions,
law schools have a fiduciary obligation. That obligation must be given
a structural correlative in order to discharge an institutional commit-
ment which transcends the good intentions, and even good deeds, of
any individual professor.
If the law schools are to fully discharge their institutional obligations
and remedy the defects generic to legal education, the line of demarca-
tion between the law school and the outside world will have to be
redrawn.
Some of the changes needed are already upon us-wrought by the
increased demands by students for "relevance." The response need not
be characterized by the anti-intellectualism and the dogmatism of some
of the demands. A major contributing factor to this new pressure will
come from the increase in the number of black students who are able,
as many of their self-styled radical white peers are not, to make asser-
tions based upon personal knowledge of the nature of the legal system,
and the extent of disenfranchisement within the society.
Unfortunately, descriptions of reality (such as the conduct of officials)
drawn from personal experience fail to comport with the neat logical
reality assumed by many professors and casebooks.32 At considerable
32. For a less than deferential view of the profession and the legal services program,
Julius Hobson's remarks at an orientation session on October 1, 1969, conducted by the
Urban Law Institute reflect the sentiments of one community leader with a record of
extensive personal experience in seeking social change both within-and in defiance
of-the traditional legal system:
The neighborhood legal services run by the poverty program for all practical pur-
poses deal with minutia. They go down on Seventh Street and argue with some
merchant about an escape clause in a contract written by Harvard people who are
too numerous and too diversified to be counted. They come out of the law school and
graduate and specialize in how you can escape paying corporate income tax or how
you can write loopholes into contracts or fill up the Harvard Law Review with
articles on the administrative and constitutional niceties which prohibit the advent
of justice in the United States. I call them the "Harvard crowd" punks, a dime-a-
dozen. All you've got to do is open the law review: one of them wrote a very beau-
tiful article on how the Hobsen v. Hansen school case (408 F.2d 175) couldn't pos-
sibly win because of the constitutional niceties and what some ancient puritanicaljudge had to say about it back in 1776. This is what we face in this community:
there are some angry men who are trying to combat these problems. There Is also
something that pervades the atmosphere that I think is good and that is that the
professionals are no longer soothsayers in these matters. Even the lawyers are belng
called to book and questioned about this.
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personal cost, black law students in predominantly white schools vainly
seek to destroy the myths of white students and professors-to pro-
pound the reality of the world they know and to challenge the reality of
the parchment world of the judicial opinion. We have seen repre-
sentations of this nonsanitized world rejected-partly because it comes
with that raw emotionalism and strident absolutism which offends tie
decorum of the law and the equanimity of the law school universe. And
all too often, black law students are forced to play jester in the king's
court--cast in the role of the law school's own "house militants." If
black law students get attention and even win some acknowledgment
and semblance of authority, they also are secretly derided as not "real"
legal craftsmen. Black students may find at last that they can be con-
ceded to be bona fide law students without the unremitting pressure
to cease being black.33
Part of the task of presenting the reality of an ineffective legal system
and a disenfranchised society can and should be transferred to the
shoulders of members of the black, the Indian, and the Mexican-Amer-
ican communities. They have something to teach the legal profession,
and they should be appointed and paid as teachers for doing so.
Just as the outside world must enter the law school, so too the law
school must expand its walls to include the urban environment in
which it is situated. Clinical legal education is the rubric under which
the law schools have undertaken their initial sortie in this direction.M
But the fashionableness of the term "clinical education" is likely to
mask a critical ambiguity. Clinical programs will tend unthinkingly
and imperceptibly to commingle the consumption and investment func-
tions, especially if such programs become a manifestation of the
self-conscious posturing, the anti-intellectualism and the uncritical de-
mand for involvement that characterizes much of the current revolt
against traditional legal education. Under such a program, the third
year of law school is devoted to "clinical work" but clinical work largely
takes the form of providing legal aid---discharging the "service func-
83. The law students who boycotted Howard Law School in September of 1969 con-
tended that they were not receiving a legal education which would equip them as lawyers
to cope with the legal problems that confront black people in America today. They
were correct in their assertion but were made to appear foolish when, in court, they
were asked to describe in detail the nature of a relevant curriculum. This was an unfair
burden to thrust on them: the law schools themselves have not been able to meet this
task. It may be asked whether the law school should not undertake to perform specific
services for portions of the community-just as certain medical schools have undertaken
to accept responsibility for the delivery of health services to different geographic sectors
of the city of Washington.
34. See, e.g., Symposium on Legal Education, 21 U. MAM, L. Rmv. 505 (1967).
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tion" of the law. The third year law student thus may come out more
nearly a competent practitioner. His guilt will be assuaged, and his
demand for "relevance" seemingly met because the needs of society for
traditional legal representation in both civil and criminal cases is well
nigh infinite. But if this is the sum total of the law schools' response,
it is in fact a default.
Clinical programs must not be permitted to degenerate into a
grandiose abdication of responsibility whereby the law school simply
abandons the student during the third year and leaves him largely to
his own devices under the guise of affording him "practical experi-
ence." It must become a joint venture in discovery for the academic
community where undigested chunks of reality are subjected to the
most highly disciplined form of intellectual scrutiny.
The law school determines who may share in the inner secrets and
mysteries of the law-who are to be accredited Men of Law and who
are not. If there is any area in which the law school preeminently can
make a unique contribution to the restructuring of the legal system,
it will be in utilizing its accrediting and training role, to expand the
manpower of the legal profession and to disseminate legal knowledge
to the population at large. The law school in the future will have to
begin working with colleges and high schools-and even grammar
schools-to develop legal curricula. It will have to learn how to utilize
the media. If television has, in McLuhan's terms, recreated the world
in the image of a global village, it is still an open question whether we
will revert to the forms of bloodletting and revenge that have charac-
terized tribal justice from the Oresteia to the Kerner Commission Re-
port.3r5 There are alternatives-but law schools will have to take respon-
35. One form of tribal justice is epitomized by the Chorus in The Libation Bearers
of the Oresteia:
It is but law that when the red drops have been spilled upon the ground they cry
aloud for fresh blood. For the death act calls out on Fury to bring out of those who
were slain before new ruin on ruin accomplished.
Washington Square Press (1953) at 118. We are indebted to Professor David Littlefleld
of Middlebury College for a penetrating analysis of developing concepts of justice,
drawn from the Oresteia to Virgil, Ovid, Shakespeare, and Yeats, among others.
The same concept is mirrored in the following passages from the REPORT or TIM NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMssSSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968):
During the 4 days of the Newark riot, when Jersey City was flooded with tales of all
description, Mayor Whelan announced that if there were any disturbances he would
"meet force with force." The ghetto area was saturated with police officers.
rd. at 39.
About 60 persons had been on the street watching the looting. As the police arrived,
three of the looters cut directly in front of the group of spectators. The police fired
at the looters. Bullets plowed into the spectators. Everyone began running . . . .Bul.
lets continued to spatter against the walls of the buildings. Finally, as the firing died
down, Morris-whose stepfather died that evening-yelled to a sergeant that Innocent
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sibility for imparting to the populace at large not merely rote legal
knowledge, but a sensitivity to those fundamental values of due process,
fair play, free speech, privacy and official accountability.
If the relative insulation of the law school is to serve any unique
function, it is to be found in the partial liberation which the detach-
ment of the institution affords from consumption pressures, and the
freedom it provides to design new legal institutions, new doctrines and
new modes of coping with the clear and present danger to the rule of
law. That insulation, that tradition of a community of scholars, be-
comes even more precious if the law school ceases to be an island for
contemplation of one's jurisprudential navel and becomes instead the
sanctum in which the inner life of the law is born and reborn of
experience.
B. The Law Firm as a Source of Investment Capital
Law firms are increasingly becoming involved in "public interest"
work. But, since lawyers have traditionally given time to innumerable
public causes, philanthropic institutions, indigent clients, and civic
affairs, what is new or promising about recent developments?
One of the most useful talents a private law firm can bring to public
interest law is its expertise in developing techniques of asserting rights
and settling disputes which minimize formal adjudication. The society
at large-and the poor and disenfranchised in particular-might well
benefit by direct borrowing and adaptation from those forums, pro-
cedures, and alternative redress systems developed to enable the power-
ful and the affluent to settle their differences efficiently, equitably, and
expeditiously without resort to the courts.
In addition, the frontiers of poverty law have increasingly moved
from welfare cases and landlord-tenant law to issues of economic de-
velopment, antitrust, tax law, communications law, and corporate law.
people were being shot. "Tell the black bastards to stop shooting at us," the sergeant,
according to Morris, replied.
Id. at 36.
On Lycaste Street, between Charlevoic and Goethe, they saw a jeep sitting at the
curb. Believing it to be another roadblock, they slowed down. Simultaneously a shot
rang out. A National Guardsman fell, hit in the ankle. Other National Guardsmen
at the scene thought the shot had come from the station wagon. Shot after shot was
directed against the vehide, at least 17 of them finding their mark. All five occupants
were injured, John Leroy fatally.
Id. at 55.
Action by police officers accounted for 20 and, v'ery likely, 21 of the deaths; action
by the National Guard for seven, and very likely, nine; action by the Army for one.
Two deaths were the action of storeowners. Four persons died acddentally. Rioters
were responsible for two, and perhaps three of the deaths; a private guard for one.
Id. at 61.
1031
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 1005, 1970
In these fields, legal service attorneys have no expertise. But neither
the poor nor the lawyers need be required to reinvent the wheel; in-
volvement of private law firms provides a ready source of expertise in
these areas. 80
Legal service programs generally are not characterized by the kind of
tight administrative management and the necessity to justify one's
expenditure of time (for billing purposes) that characterizes private
practice. Public interest law firms might do well to emulate the tech-
niques of office management time keeping, training techniques, and
administrative discipline which determine both survival and profit
margins in private practice. From another vantage point, the organiza-
tional structure of the private bar provides a potential network of
watchdog institutions to hold the government accountable as it decen-
tralizes its operations.
If private law firm involvement in public interest law is to be more
than simply a public relations repackaging of the pro bono work which
a firm has always done, the critical ingredient will be the structural or
organizational measures taken by the firm to give public interest work
new status and new prominence.37 Depending upon the way in which
86. Legal service programs generally are not characterized by the kind of tight ad,
ministrative management and the necessity to justify one's expenditure of time (for
billing purposes) that characterizes private practice. Public interest law firms might do
well to emulate the techniques of office management, time keeping, training techniques,
and administrative discipline which determine both survival and profit margins In pri-
vate practice. From another vantage point, the organizational structure of the private
bar provides a potential nationwide network of watchdog institutions to hold the gov-
ernment accountable as it decentralizes its operations.
87. If we are to see law firms undertaking involvement in the public interest field
on a massive scale, a two-fold process will have to be intensified and accelerated: the
pressure now coming from law students will have to be sustained and intensified, and
the capacity of law firms to respond to that pressure in a creative and informed manner
will have to be increased.
Last fall, the Citizens Advocate Center and the Urban Law Institute launched a cam.
paign to stimulate student pressure on law firms, based on the position that graduating law
students could dramatically increase the availability of legal representation to the poor and
other forms of public service work if, as a condition of employment with private law
firms, they would seek both information and meaningful guarantees that the firm would
commit substantial time and resources to public service work. 15 STUDENT LAw J. 70(1969).
Over the past months, numerous questionnaires (See Appendix I) have been sent out
to law firms, some relatively neutral in tone, others distinctly adversary in nature-some
extremely general others quite detailed. Law firm interviewers report that they are In-
creasingly being met with questions about their firms' involvement in public interest
work-and innumerable symposiums, local bar meetings, lecturers, law review articles,
petitions, confrontations, picketing, and panel discussions all testify to the increasing
pressure to which law firms have been subjected of late to make distinctive commitments
in this area. See Woodward, Private Law Firms and Legal Services for the Poor, 28 LE.
GAL AID BRIEFCASE 171 (1970).
The most promising step toward sustaining pressure, interest, and informed response
would come from the establishment of a continuous updated Reporter service assembled
by teams of law students as a result of in-depth interviews with major law firms around
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the firm chooses to institutionalize its public interest commitment,
there are at least five major advantages which can flow from structural
innovations.
First, the creation of a structural unit (involving bookkeeping, work
assignments, physical plant, cost accounting, etc.) operates to insulate
a minimal body of man hours and resources from the constant erosion
and downgrading which formerly have operated to subordinate pro
bono work to the demands of paying clients and to prevent full mobil-
ization of the firm's institutional resources. This subordination can be
halted by an assignment structure that treats both kinds as equally
appropriate ways to expend firm time. Once such assignments are
elevated to co-equal status, an attorney engaged in pro bono work can
afford, and indeed can be required, to produce the same quality of work
and the same intensity of effort expended in paying cases.38
the country. The questionnaire developed in conjunction with law firms last summer by
the Citizens Advocate Center and the Urban Law Institute (see Appendix I) provides
at least a point of departure for such interviews and attempts to use in-depth requests
for disclosure and dialogue as a means of generating informed, non-hostile pressure on
law firms while at the same time securing additional information on how to proceed
in a field where no one has "the answer" and where it is impossible to begin to suggest
the range of possible approaches which experimentation could and should generate. It
is too early for prescribing a dogmatic blueprint. It is not too early to ask questions about
the nature and extent of law firm involvement.
A Public Interest Law Reporter or directory could inform law students as to what
they might reasonably expect, what specific law firms interviewing on campus are doing,
what alternatives other law firms might have to offer-and might also contain information
on the extent to which representations made by recruiters in past years had been honored
by concrete affirmative action on the part of the firm. Such a directory would help local
groups seek legal assistance efficiently and would also help reduce threshold problems
that stem from lack of contact, information, and plain fear.
The Reporter itself could in turn be the catalyst for generating a series of discussions,
conferences, and symposia on standards of professional obligations and joint exploration
by practitioners, the academic community, potential client groups, and law students as
to what approaches remained to be explored in the public interest field. It is difficult
to predict what might emerge from such a directory, though in-depth interviews would
themselves be a powerful stimulant to action and commitment by law firms.
It is at best dubious to envision the development of any massive approach to collective
bargaining by law students. The profession appears to attract more than its share of
individualists. And one cannot readily see law firms sitting down in collective bargaining
sessions at each campus. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that one would begin to
see students signing declarations of conscience, or petitions, or entering into dialogues
within law schools, or on a local level with a consortium of law firms, to develop minimal
standards of public service obligation for the profession, taking appropriate cognizance
of local conditions, resources and needs. On the national level, a parallel development
would be discussions taking place between law students and lawyers within forums pro-
vided by the organized bar to begin to define realistic standards and hammer out state-
ments of commitment.
The reporting service could and should be expanded to include articles, proposals,
case histories, observations, and critiques-and thus could provide a central clearing
house and resource book for educating law students and law firms alike regarding devel-
opments in this area. Given the manifold catalytic effects and the potential of such a
directory and reporting service, its prompt establishment appears for die moment to
represent the most productive strategy for generating widespread law firm involvement
in public interest work.
S. If this is to occur, then one danger to be confronted squarely in creating public
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Second, the creation of a structural unit within the firm is likely to
produce a significant quantitative increase in the firm's involvement in
the public interest law field. Increased efficiency is likely to result from
approaching pro bono work in the same manner as regular firm mat-
ters. The peculiar advantages that a large law firm has over the solo
practitioner are well known; ironically, however, in the past even the
senior partner of a firm has often had to forego these special institu-
tional advantages when contributing time in the public interest field.
Ability to tap additional expertise, to summon the help of other as-
sociates, to utilize the xerox and the secretarial pool are all part of the
special "economies of scale" which the structural arrangements of a
law firm can now extend to public interest work. Finally, increased
quantitative involvement is likely to stem from the increased demand
upon the firm generated by the formal creation of a public interest di-
vision. Most grass roots organizations, community leaders, organizations
(and certainly individual minority group members) are not accustomed
to think of major law firms as sources of help in time of need unless
the law firm has taken some formal step to hold itself out as a resource
in a manner which makes the firm more approachable and less formid.
able to this new clientele. Capacity begets demand; formalized structure
provides a point of entry and a gesture of welcome necessary to span
the gulf which has barred groups and individuals from access to "equal
protection of the law" in the fullest sense of that term.
Third, by structuring a commitment of resources, it becomes possible
for the first time for a firm to come face to face with the magnitude and
nature of the contribution it is already making in the public interest
field. Once it can quantify the contribution in terms of man hours and
dollars, it can begin to think in terms of impact, of capital investment
and priorities. If a large firm finds that it is committing several hundred
thousand dollars worth of legal resources in the public interest field, it
may begin to ask whether the firm is getting the most impact and so,
ciety the greatest benefit from that contribution."9 In some firms, dis.
interest divisions within private law firms will be that of insulation of those engaged In
public interest work from the main body of the firm. If this occurs, those in the pub.
lic service division or those on loan or those staffing the "satellite office" will be viewed
as second class members of the firm. We have noted that even where a co.equal dlvi.
sion of a firm is created with power to make public interest assignments throughout
the firm, there is a marked tendency not to dispense such assignments to senior partners
of the firm-and this can have grave consequences.
39. Thus, for instance, if a substantial portion of time is expended on assigned
criminal cases for indigent defender, the firm may begin to ask itself whether It would
not be more efficient to secure specialized supervision for that work, whether the expertiso
that it has built up can be utilized to effect an overhaul of our system of criminal fustice,
and whether there is any way in which the firm can force the legal system to get at
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cussion has already gravitated to just this issue in the planning process.
Decisions about public interest cases cease to be isolated decisions.
They become, cumulatively, a form of policy-making by a law firm
about the needs of the legal system, the special assets of the firm in
contributing to the restructuring of that system, and the potential for
significant contribution which exceeds in impact the sum of all the
hours previously given on an isolated, hit or miss basis. Such dialogue
may well lead to a decision that time is better spent in devising new
kinds of legal institutions and creating dispute-settling and avoidance
mechanisms designed to increase the capacity of the legal system to
produce justice on a mass basis. Most important, structure provides the
format for creating within each law firm an internal forum for bringing
the entire legal profession to grips with the broader dimensions of the
crisis faced by the rule of law.
There are those who would seriously question whether this is an
advantage, since major law firms are in fact already a power elite and
the ultimate symbol of "the Establishment." Yet, the cumulative result
of decisions made by default about the legal order are far more likely
to perpetuate the status quo and to disregard the public interest, than
decisions made consciously and rooted in that form of direct lawyer-
client involvement which converts social problems from abstractions
to personal realities, which quickens the sense of injustice and which
spreads throughout the legal profession the perspective of the victim,
the aggrieved, the injured, the disenfranchised, and the poor. To the
extent that law firms already operate as the makers of public policy-
with regard to the operation and design of the legal system, with respect
to the conduct of powerful corporate clients, and with respect to official
governmental policy-then direct conscious involvement in public
interest work is essential if law firms are not to be the unwitting per-
petrators of institutionalized injustice.
A fourth virtue which the private lawyer would bring to a public
interest practice is a much stronger sense of the meaning of the lawyer-
client relationship than that held by lawyers for the poor. We have
observed-both in the law reform units set up in legal service programs
and also in day to day interaction between legal service attorneys and
their clients-that there is a greater tendency to manipulate, to usurp
group decision-making functions, to use clients to fit the private agenda
underlying causes that impede rehabilitation, guarantee recidivism, and contribute to
the prevalence of crime and delinquency. Similarly the firm may begin to take a hard
look at the operation of the court system, the conduct of police ofcials, and the utility
of time spent on honorary boards and community chests.
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of the lawyer than is to be found in private practice. There are several
contributing causes which induce lawyers for the poor to cease to be
accountable to clients and to aggrandize their role as "social engineers"
and self-styled reformers. It is not clear whether they feel free to do so
because the clients are poor or members of minority groups or because
legal service programs have a monopoly which makes it impossible for
the client not to concur in any decision by the attorney. All contribute:
the arrogance of youth, the monopoly power of attorneys, and conde-
scension based on race and class. None are consistent with the tradi-
tional lawyer-client relationship. All are especially pernicious when the
client is poor and when legal advocacy serves as a quasi-political form
of enfranchisement, for then client manipulation perverts not only the
legal system but also the democratic process itself. Competition with
private law firms-where a different tradition and different constraints
define the lawyer-client relationship-might have a salutory and chas-
tening effect on the public interest bar.
One last, and critical, advantage would stem from increased institu-
tional involvement of private law firms in public interest work. It would
help avert, or at least mitigate, polarization within the legal profession
between those engaged in public interest or poverty law and those en-
gaged in the fields traditional to private practice. So long as those in
private practice are cast in the role of villains, then public interest work
is likely to be relegated to an inferior status within the profession, and
the ability of legal service programs to attract top talent will be mark-
edly diminished. Moreover, such a polarization will erode, if not
destroy, the base of political support provided by the organized bar-
the legal service program's mainstay and chief protection. 40 How long
can one expect the organized bar to support the expansion of a program
which increases the cost of private practice, drains off many of the most
talented law graduates, intensifies the bidding for top law students, and
stigmatizes private practice as the embodiment of the Enemy? If public
interest work becomes the private preserve of the few, the entire field
is likely to become static, dominated by those who "got there first."
The entire profession, not just an elite which presently tends to regard
40. Cf. Segal, The Higher Calling of the Bar, 28 LEGAL Am BuarcASE No. 5r at 157
(Apr., 1970).
See also Hannon, The Murphy Amendments and the Response of the Bar An Accurate
Test of Political Strength, 28 LEGAL Am BRIEFCASE No. 5 at 163 (Apr., 1970). At page
165, Hannon quotes the Wall Street Journal as saying, "indeed, Congress quite probably
would stop this program if President Earl F. Morris and other leaders of the American
Bar Association were not busily lobbying to uphold Mr. Shriver's hand." Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 8, 1967, at 1.
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itself as the pure and the virtuous, must become actively engaged in the
business of justice.
What is the best structural form for a private law firm's involvement
in public interest law? It is too early to give any definitive answer, but
several approaches to public interest work have been developed by
private law firms. They include the creation of a public service division
within the firm; staffing of a satellite or branch office; development of
referral arrangements for major public interest cases and projects;
placing lawyers on loan with legal service and other public interest
institutions; and select retainer relationships with specific community
groups and national organizations. Each of these arrangements may
provide a different form of capital resource, available for enhancing
the fundamental productive capacity of the legal system. Each may de-
volve into a purely service operation where all resources are immedi-
ately siphoned off into the consumption function by a wave of crisis
service demands.
Yet, if there is any single distinctive-and promising-aspect about
the highly publicized involvement of private law firms in public interest
work, it is in the emphasis on structure common to all. The setting
aside, as a matter of the firm's internal organization, of a specified
quantum of resources for use in the public interest can constitute a
major breakthrough.41
V. Democratizing the Rule of Law
Ultimately, the value of increased investment by law firms ,nd law
schools in public interest work will be measured by whether such efforts
accelerate the development of a restructured legal system which is
capable of meeting the mass demand for justice by providing new rem-
edies, new sources of redress, and new forums for the equitable resolu-
tion of conflicts. If the present legal system is to develop the expanded
capacity necessary to cope with the Rights Explosion, the Grievance
Explosion, and the assault now being made upon the New Sovereign
Immunity, it will require systematic and sustained investment and
innovation.
The most obvious areas for investment necessary to equip the legal
system to deal with a democracy's mass demand for justice have already
41. All have wanted to preserve some elements of laissez faLre for the individual
partner or associate to accept some non-paying cases as a purely personal matter. See
Appendix II for an analysis of some other practical aspects of a private firm's involve-
ment in public interest law.
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been listed and a few illustrations given: the creation of new justice-
dispensing institutions; the expansion of the legal manpower supply
through new modes of legal education and accreditation; the develop-
ment of new procedural and substantive rights; and the utilization of
forms of group representation as a mode of enfranchisement.
Elsewhere we have suggested some other of the specific forms which
such investment might take.42 It would be premature and presumptuous
now to attempt still another set of specific proposals. We must wait to
see what will come from those first two steps-utilization of law firms
and law schools as sources of investment for restructuring the legal sys-
tem. But at all points, it becomes necessary to recognize that the pro-
fession can best discharge its obligation to the rule of law by relinquish-
ing an exclusionary control of legally protected advocacy, by ceasing to
deny legitimacy to new legal institutions and by ceasing to interpose
barriers to expansion of legal manpower which serve no functional
purpose and which operate primarily to keep justice in short supply.
These barriers to democratizing the rule of law can manifest them-
selves in any of the above-mentioned areas of investment-from the
creation of new legal institutions to the development of new forms of
group representation. At present one finds an exclusionary quality
about the legal system which disenfranchises (in varying degrees) all
non-lawyers, pitting the legal system in conflict with lay advocates of
social justice. The incapacity of the legal system to effectuate the legit-
imate-and judicially recognized-demands of minority groups for the
equal protection of the law provides the most graphic illustration of
the explosive consequences of a legal system which disenfranchises lay-
men, leaving them only the forum of the streets.
There is a second dimension of this exclusionary characteristic of
the legal system-one which has long held sway within the inner sanc-
tum of the law. It stands as a barrier within the legal system and the
legal profession to effective democratization of the rule of law. That
barrier is institutional racism-within the legal profession and within
the legal system.
Analytically, racism is just a sub-class of the broader exclusionary
principle--disenfranchisement. Just as laymen are disenfranchised with
respect to the operation of the legal system itself, so within the legal
profession there are the disenfranchised: young lawyers, women law-
yers, and minority group lawyers. All are discriminated against within
42. See Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41
Nonm DE I.wYE, 927 (1966).
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the profession-all are disenfranchised in varying degrees and excluded
from full participation in the governance of the legal system.
But we are a nation founded on genocide and nurtured on slavery.
And thus, racism has historically been the particular form through
which the generic evil, disenfranchisement, has consistently found its
most symbolic and visible expression. Accordingly, we single out racism
-in the legal profession and in public interest law-as that manifesta-
tion of disenfranchisement which preeminently poses a clear and present
danger to any effort to expand the capacity of the legal system to yield
justice for all. Racism takes many forms within the law, for we are
talking about an evil far more subtle and pervasive than that susceptible
to elimination by any simplistic quota system.
The virtually segregated composition of the legal profession-over
98% white-is now generally recognized. And this state of affairs will
exist for some time to come. Despite concerted efforts by some law
schools, the minority group composition of the total law school student
body remains below five per cent. The statistical pattern of racial dis-
enfranchisement within the legal system extends to the judiciary, to
law school faculties, to law firms and to the organized bar. And this
pattern is perpetuated, according to reports we have received, by wide-
spread discrimination by some admissions committees against black
candidates for admission to the bar.
But the dimensions of racism within the legal system are more than
statistical. Racism takes the form of condescension toward black solo
practitioners, characterizing them as legal hacks. The profession views
graduates of black law schools as presumptively incompetent and fur-
ther compounds the insult by viewing older black lawyers as "out of
touch" with the black revolution. Younger black (brown and red) law-
yers who take militant stances are presumed to be poor craftsmen, con-
cerned with radical rhetoric rather than qualified as true professionals.
The more pernicious criticism denigrates them as unprofessional in
manner, irresponsible, psychologically scarred, unsound in judgment
because of racial loyalties and, thus, regrettably unacceptable to the
select inner circles of law firms, policy making bodies or collegial social
gatherings.
The legal profession has its own seemingly neutral but in fact racially
biased standards that impose disabilities upon minority group prac-
titioners on account of race. Race, however, is expressly denied as the
basis. That is currently neither fashionable nor acceptable. The criti-
cism is typically directed at a seemingly individual or idiosyncratic flaw
-style, language, ethnically rooted leadership roles, patterns of com-
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munication, or modes of advocacy. The Anglo-Saxon (and for that
matter, Roman) mold in which our system is cast extends beyond pig-
mentation. It is permeated by a racially biased etiquette disguised
under seemingly objective, procedural and stylistic niceties that are
propounded as supposedly functional standards of "true" professional
performance.
And sad to say, such arrogance born of racism infects even the seem-
ingly pure field of poverty law.
The white lawyer is one of the few professionals still welcome among
the most racially militant groups. De Toqueville was uncannily per-
ceptive when he stated that "[t]he profession of the law is the only
aristocratic element" with which "the natural elements of democracy"
will combine.43 But from our direct personal contact with legal service
attorneys in varied programs-law reform units, research centers, and
VISTA lawyers stationed in the field and living in impoverished neigh-
borhoods-De Toqueville's characterization likening American lawyers
to the aristocratic classes of Europe remains disturbingly accurate:
They participate in the same instinctive love of order and formal-
ities; and they entertain the same repugnance to the actions of the
multitude, and the same secret contempt of the government of
the people. 4
Legal advocacy when tainted by racism can readily be converted
into a form of imperialism by expertise which increases dependence
and manipulates clients under the guise of providing assistance. We
have seen this take place in the legal service programs-where lawyers
"for" the poor decide what in their professional collective wisdom is in
the best interests of the poor. Consequently, they draft legislation; they
handle test cases, and for the most part studiously avoid all contact with
those insights which come from neighborhood offices, from contact with
live clients, from group representation or from any structural mech-
anism of accountability to the constituency they ostensibly serve. In.
creasingly, the essentially antidemocratic and elitist characteristics of
the profession leave the poor, the discriminated against (and even the
middle class who are "legally indigent") with a bundle of unenforceable
rights and unredressable but legitimate grievances. Racism as the quint.
essence of disenfranchisement leaves the poor and disenfranchised wait-
ing helpless and dependent on a profession that discards its own ethical
standards when dealing with minority groups and impoverished clients.
43. 1 A. DETocQumvL a, DMOcmACY iN AMEICA 301 (Barnes & Co. 1858).
44. Id. at 298.
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Poverty lawyers, without realizing the implications of their elitism,
unwittingly become part of the vast bureaucracy charged with the care
and tending of the poor and lacking in any accountability to the poor.
In some instances legal service programs have been gravely unrespon-
sive to major needs, concerns and grievances of the client population-
as unresponsive as the very institutions that have been a source of
injustice to the poor. Legal advocacy can be emancipating; it can com-
pel accountability in a manner which enhances the capacity of indi-
viduals to cope on their own, to secure justice, and to avoid injury. But
we will not bring justice to the poor by a wholesale importation of
attorneys to swell the ranks of those care-taking officials who presently
help to perpetuate dependency.
Until new legal institutions are structured that permit laymen to
enforce effectively their own rights, the key guarantee that legal repre-
sentation will not be used as a form of manipulation to generate de-
pendency is to be found in the time-honored nature of the lawyer-client
relationship-a relationship which makes the lawyer the employee of
the client, accountable to the client and retained to use his professional
skills as an advocate on behalf of his client's best interest. But the client
retains the ultimate power to determine what that best interest is. In-
explicably, lawyers for the poor seem to feel freer to discard this funda-
mental relationship-perhaps because they are not paid by the client,
perhaps because they perceive the client as powerless to do anything
about it. Thus in the case of the poor, the lawyer may feel that he can,
with impunity, impose his own will and his own convictions as to what
is "best for his client." And in some instances-where law reform
units, research centers, or academic institutions have become in-
volved-there is no identifiable client, present or prospective, to whom
one need feel accountable.
In this respect, it must be said that private law firms tend to honor
the lawyer-client relationship more scrupulously than poverty lawyers.
And the evil of professional imperialism (which is the form racism takes
in the poverty law field) must be dealt with by designing ways to insti-
tutionalize, reinforce, and enforce the client perspective. Most recently,
this has taken the form of using clients in the evaluation of perfor-
mance by legal service programs. 4a Short of some such attempt to con-
45. Partially in recognition of the need to create a mechanism for compelling account.
ability to clients, the Standing Committee on Legal Aid of the American Bar Association
passed a precedent-setting resolution on February 21, 1970, endorsing the proposed pro-
gram of the Clients' Council to evaluate the performance of legal .ervices programs and
to increase the accountability of those programs to the poor. This was the first time
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front the racism within our legal system, we are unlikely to be able to
eliminate it in subtle forms elsewhere.
In the field of poverty law, and now in the field of public interest
law, one may witness the same lack of accountability to the rule of law
for which we have criticized private law firms and law schools. Yet, in
the public interest field, the power to serve the public can all too
readily be viewed as a personal possession-a private prerogative to play
god in defining the public interest for the public. The legal profession
holds its status, its power, and its skills in trust-a public trust which
racism can all too readily pervert into a new elitist imperialism cloaked
in the garb of righteousness.
One can already see this danger manifesting itself in public interest
law in the legal profession's version of "benign neglect." It finds its
most invidious expression in the allocation of priorities without ac-
countability in such a manner as to divert attention away from the dis-
enfranchised, the discriminated against, and the poor. It is not a matter
of subjective intent-but of result.
Thus, when lawyers, law students, and law schools respond to the
legitimate need to represent the consumer of material goods, but do so
to the exclusion of attacking the manufacturers of even more danger-
ously defective social goods (education, health services, public housing,
urban renewal programs, etc.) they unwittingly divert scrutiny from
those who would perpetuate institutionalized racism. When lawyers
quite properly attack the lawlessness of regulatory agencies, but, in that
preoccupation, leave immune from scrutiny the far greater lawlessness
that pervades the grant-making agencies of government, they help to
ensure that those officials in charge of grant-making programs are, for
all intents and purposes, not subject to the rule of law. Yet, more than
any other group of citizens who need public interest representation,
the poor and members of minority groups may depend, as a matter
of life itself, on the relatively new but extensive array of government
grant programs which provide sustenance and shelter and opportunity,
To ignore lawlessness in these realms, particularly when one belongs
to a profession that possesses a monopoly on the skills and access re-
quired to halt that lawlessness, is to become an unwitting party to its
that the organized bar has ever acknowledged the possibility that non-lawyers might
have a function in policing the performance of the profession. The Clients' Council
was originally supported by funds channeled through NLADA, and subsequently was
funded for one year by OEO Legal Services. Several training programs and evaluation
contracts let by OEO now bear a special condition requiring paid participation (on a
contractual basis) by the Clients' Council.
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perpetuation. Each action, however righteous in itself, precludes alter-
native actions when resources are finite. And the morality of a given act
depends in the final analysis on those other alternatives which were
rejected, even if unwittingly.
Such "racism by inadvertence" or "selective inattention" now takes
its most ironic form in the new crusade over pollution. There were
those among us who truly valued the beauty of this land. They viewed
their own personal life story simply as
the story of all life that is holy and is good to tell, and of us two-
leggeds sharing in it with the four-leggeds and the wings of their
air and all green things; for these are children of one mother and
their father is one Spirit. 4
These peoples who understand that man does not stand apart from
his universe, we killed, and their survivors we herded to reservations,
America's prisoners of war. They remain there to this day, still holding
to that sense of the sacredness of nature. 7 Yet, to this day, we ignore
both their wisdom and their plight altogether.
Instead we proceed to seek more money to subsidize the maintenance
of racism. Having subsidized the flight to the suburbs by building high-
ways (for the national defense, of course), we are now called upon,
under the banner of pollution, to clean up the waste products of the
suburbs-to cleanse the water by paying for the waste treatment plants
that suburban developers neglected to plan and that suburban dwellers
decline to pay for, and to clean the air of those fumes spewed by com-
muters in their daily foray into the cities and back. Under the same
banner of pollution, the major suppliers of utilities who are among the
chief offenders will pass on their costs to the consumer in what amounts
to a regressive tax which hits the urban poor hardest, the suburban
dweller less hard (because a uniform per unit charge in effect discrim-
inates in his favor), and the industrial user least hard. The poor will
underwrite this war too as they have the war in Vietnam. Under the
46. Statement of Black Elk, an Oglala Sioux holy man, printed in Tnn INDIxN z
ArNmucA's PAst (Forbes ed., 1964).
47. Those who would question the continued vitality of that culture, its special beauty
and its will to survive might do well to read the 1969 Pulitzer prize winning novel by
F. Scott Momaday, HousE MADE OF DAwN. Former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall
has remarked: "It is ironical that the conservation movement finds itsell turning back
to ancient Indian land ideas, to the Indian understanding that we are not outside nature,
but of it." But in our arrogance and pride we do not heed the ancient Indian proverb:
The frog does not
Drink up
The pond in which
He lives.
1043
The Yale Law Journal
banner of pollution, we are asked to postpone expenditures for and to
avert our eyes from the greater waste and pollution of our nearly bank-
rupt and poverty-ridden cities, our migrant camps, our Indian reserva-
tions, and the poverty-blighted mountain hollows of Appalachia. The
concept of ecology preached by the new conservationists-and incorpo-
rated into the new public law gospel-does not appear to include those
two-legged animals of varied hues who are the most hard hit by urban
and industrial pollution, and heavily subsidized corporate farming
complete with pesticides (which we now claim so solicitiously menaces
plant and animal life).
It is excusable that the political system should move in this direction
and be primarily, if not exclusively, responsive to the majority's con-
cerns. One may lament the decision of a political system that chooses to
deal only with those waste products which have reached the point of
becoming distasteful, dangerous, or inconveniently costly to a rural-
suburban white majority. But one can reconcile oneself to such a legis-
lative decision by rationalizing it as the price of majority rule.
There can be no such excuse for the legal profession and especially
for those who profess a concern for true social justice. For the law
has traditionally provided the only avenue of redress for the disen-
franchised. And the allocation of scarce legal resources away from the
poor, the black, the Mexican American, the Puerto Rican, and the
Indian deprive him of the only political weapon available to him. At
a time when government money (and now foundation money) will no
longer be spent to enable the disenfranchised to claim their rightful
share of the wealth and opportunity of this nation, the only form of
advocacy left may well be stripped from minorities by the crusading
members of a profession which is 98% white. At a time when the polit-
ical system has become less responsive, if not outright hostile, to the
grievances of ethnic minorities, the only profession specially protected
in an advocacy role cannot justify its dereliction by regrouping under
the righteous banner of essentially majoritarian concerns.
Public interest law's greatest contribution can be in generating the
reallocation of legal manpower necessary to institutionalize representa-
tion for all those interests-the consumer's, the citizen's and the pub.
lic's-which have gone unrepresented or under-represented for too long.
It is essentially a call for a redistribution of legal manpower which is
now arrayed too one-sidedly on behalf of powerful private interests to
the detriment of the public interest.
Yet, if public interest law is not to go down in history as the legal
profession's own era of Reconstruction, there must be as keen a concern
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over the allocation of legal resources within the public interest field as
there is over the allocation of legal resources between private and
public interests. We will know soon enough. The test is dear. Will
public interest law cross the Racial Rubicon?
Appendix I
A Proposed Questionnaire to Law Firms
The following questions are suggested as raising some of the issues
and securing some of the information most pertinent to ascertaining
the extent of a law firm's present and potential commitment to public
service work.
1. What kind of public service work is presently done by the firm,
either as a firm or as members acting in their individual capacity?
Could you give some examples?
2. How does the firm presently handle the current public service
work of its members? Are time records kept just as if such hours were
treated as billable hours? Are public service cases added to the firm's
file system? Are secretaries, messengers, law clerks and other lawyers
available on an overtime basis to complete a crash assignment in the
public service area just as they would be for a regular paying client? Do
associates working on a public interest case feel as free to go-and do
they in fact, go-to a senior partner for advice or assistance as they
would if it were a regular firm matter?
3. Has the firm made a quantitative assessment of the hours and
dollar resources it already devotes to public service work? If so, what
is the total, in terms of billable hours and dollar valuation? If not, is
such an assessment planned?
4. If the firm has analyzed the aggregate resources currently ex-
pended on public service work, has it analyzed the current utilization
of those resources to determine whether it would be possible to make
more effective use of part or all of those resources? Has the firm de-
veloped any criteria as a firm for assessing the effectiveness of the re-
sources now devoted to such work? If so, what are they? If not, is such
an assessment planned-when and by whom?
5. What is the firm's present attitude toward public service work by
its members? (Laissez-faire? Approval? Active encouragement? Formal
assignments?) Has the firm taken formal action to express its position
on this kind of work? If so, what form has that action taken? How often,
and how explicitly is this policy communicated to new associates after
they join the firm?
6. What would be the reaction of the firm if an associate turned in
only ten or twenty billable hours for several weeks at a time because
of involvement in public sector work? Would it redound to his detri-
ment in terms of consideration for promotions, raises, bonuses? Is there
any means by which it could redound to his benefit within the firm?
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7. What is your assessment of the most appropriate forms of public
service work for individual lawyers and for the firms, at present? What
do you consider the particular strengths and areas of expertise of your
firm? Has the firm considered undertaking, or already undertaken, a
specific project or mission in the public service field which would use
its special strengths or expertise? Has it consulted with any persons
concerning developing a project or line of public service specialty?
8. Are there any areas, types of cases, or types of clients that the firm
would not approve of as an appropriate form of public service work-
either for an individual member acting on his own or for the firm to
undertake as part of the firm's ongoing caseload? Are there any groups
too militant to be acceptable as clients? Are there any issues, offhand,
which the firm might consider too controversial to become involved
with? How would such determinations be made within the firm?
10. By what means does a person, or does the firm, presently become
involved in public service work? Has the firm gone beyond simply per-
mitting individuals to contribute personal time (after the firm's business
is completed)?
11. Has the firm entered into any formal arrangements to facilitate
individual members' contributions to traditional civil or criminal
representation; undertaking special projects through the Lawyers Com-
mittee, Legal Service Program or other organization; taking on, as
retainer clients, particular non-profit community groups? What is the
extent and depth of participation in those arrangements in terms of
number of persons participating and time devoted to public service
work through these arrangements?
12. Has the firm entered into any formal arrangements for involving
the firm itself- including use of the firm's name, resources, senior part.
ners, and formal supervisory structure-for particular forms of public
service work?
13. Has there been much expression of interest to date within the
firm on the part of younger members or senior partners in engaging in
public service work? Does the firm encourage or allow members to take
leaves of absence in order to undertake public service work with a
right to return to the firm without loss of status? Has any younger law-
yer left the firm recently or taken a leave of absence because of a desire
to devote full time to public service work?
14. Has the firm considered any particular policy for accommodating
the desires of those interested in doing public service work to the neces-
sity of handling the ongoing, paying business of the firm?
15. Has your firm actively sought to recruit minority group attor-
neys and law students, not only from the top prestige schools, but from
predominantly black law schools? Does it have any minority group
lawyers in the firm and at what rank within the firm?
16. Would your firm be willing to contribute a percentage of its
profits for the next three years to a national scholarship fund for minor-
ity group law students? If so, what percentage would the firm consider
appropriate?
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Appendix II
Practical Issues of Private Law Firm Involvement in
Public Interest Law
A. Profit and Loss
For some law firms, a commitment to become involved in public in-
terest law conjures up fears of imminent bankruptcy and of an inunda-
tion by the non-paying, work-evoking legal problems of the yellow
hordes of the East who will swoop down into the downtown reception
rooms.
Perhaps the critical determinant of a law firm's decision to move or
not to commit itself in this area will be the extent to which it has a time-
keeping system sufficiently precise to enable it to record and retrieve a
continuous and prompt statement of the number of billable hours and
nonbillable hours which the firm's partners and associates are putting
in each week. Some law firms will say that if they actually required list-
ing of the pro bono work done by firm members, it would expose the
contributions of some firm members to the less friendly eyes of others,
and thereby destroy the pro bono program. In fact, the contrary is the
case. Total honesty with respect to the kinds of hours logged appears to
be nearly a prerequisite of informed decision making by a firm as to
whether, and to how great an extent, it can become involved in the
public interest sector.
Most law firms already have begun to create separate categories for
nonbillable hours-including time spent serving the legal needs of
office staff, professional reading, conferences, bar activities, assigned de-
fender cases, etc. A firm may find, if it looks honestly at what it is doing,
that already more than 15 per cent of the hours put in by partners and
associates is nonbillable. Costs become less frightening as they become
more susceptible of control, scrutiny, and rational informed delibera-
tion. It is not a coincidence that one major Washington law firm felt
able to make a massive public interest law commitment shortly after it
instituted a computerized time-keeping system which could provide
immediate readings on the extent to which the minimum of billable
hours needed to sustain expenses and minimal incomes of firm members
was being maintained.
Pro bono work must be recorded in as detailed a fashion as time de-
voted to paying clients if the spectre of an open-ended financial burden
to the firm's partners, associates, and clients is to be banished.
B. Vehicles for Securing Pro Bono Clients
Different law firms have taken different approaches to ensure that
their "plunge" into the public interest field has sex appeal-because of
a genuine desire to do something significant, because of the firm's desire
to establish a reputation or project an image, and because of the recruit-
ment value which a clearly identifiable and significant form of activity
can have.
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The methods by which law firms have sought, upon entering this
field, to ensure that their public interest clients and issues will be sig-
nificant have varied widely. The office in the ghetto is one technique
(whether staffed by associates, supported by a number of firms, or op.
perated by the Lawyers Committee). The recruitment of a person to
head up a public interest department who has expertise and ready
entree to community groups is another. The development of a referral
network through formal or informal agreements is still another.
Some of these arrangements have given offense to the minority prac-
titioners in the area. Some have proven to be illusory in their ability
to generate significant cases which challenge the firm's imagination and
capacity. Others have produced significant cases but have identified
them with the ACLU or Lawyers Committee or other group, so that
the firm cannot garner the credit which it may need and deserve for
purposes of recruitment and general reputation.
Several devices for securing significant cases have emerged as a
result of an agreement worked out between the Urban Law Institute
and Arnold and Porter to establish a Housing Law Unit. Under this
agreement the law firm undertakes to provide supervision for graduate
law students and law students engaged in matters undertaken by the
project. Experience with this arrangement suggests several other
possibilities:
(1) arrangements between law schools and law firms by which prac-
titioners are given adjunct faculty appointments, with their teaching
taking the form of supervising students responsible for specific projects
and cases;
(2) arrangements between an "establishment" law firm and a minor-
ity practitioner which enable the minority practitioner to continue
heavy involvement in community affairs, provide a basic retainer fee
that can help subsidize the minority lawyer's practice and which, at the
same time, provide an entree for the law firm into cases, issues and
clients to which it might not otherwise have access;
(3) arrangements between law firms and other institutions (local legal
service programs, lawyers committees, urban law institutes, advocate
centers, community groups, urban coalitions, League of Women Voters
research projects and other such activities) where the institution can
provide an informed focus for the firm's legal advocacy and legal repre-
sentation, while simultaneously expanding the manpower supply ofjustice-dispensing institutions.
Whatever the referral and cooperative arrangements utilized to se-
cure clients, it is essential that the law firm be publicly identified with
each case, issue or project the firm handles. The use of the firm name
will (1) ensure quality work since the firm's reputation in the legal
community will be at stake and (2) allow the firm to reap its just mea-
sure of advantages (in professional image and in recruiting) for its work.
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